

White Fang is not a dog. What about Dumbo?

Léo Zaradzki

Logic Colloquium 2018, Udine



Presentation outline

1. Elements of linguistics
2. Existing approaches
3. Proposal and Perspectives


Compositional Semantics

Semantics:

- Takes the syntactic structure of a sentence as an input
- Applies **formal rules** to derive the meaning of the sentence, in a compositional way
- Returns a **semantic representation** of this meaning

Classical view: Knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing its **truth-conditions**.

Example: “Thetis loves a mortal”



Montague Semantics

- Based on simple type theory: two basic types (e and t), and one constructor (\rightarrow)
 - Common nouns and intransitive verbs are both represented as **predicates** (of type $e \rightarrow t$).
-

A few problems (among others):

- “The television ate a cake” is a well-formed sentence.
- Donkey anaphoras like “If John owns a donkey, he beats it” can’t be represented in a compositional way.
- Model can’t distinguish between sense and reference.

Martin-Löf Type Theory

- It's an **alternative to set theory**. Basic objects are types.
- The proposition “ $a = b$ ” is well-formed only if a and b are of the same type (in fact, there is an equality relation for each single type).
- There is a (1-1) correspondence between types and **logical propositions**. In particular, for objects a, b of some type A , the proposition “ $a = b$ ” is itself a type.
- An inhabitant of a type is a **proof** of the corresponding proposition.


Semantics based on Rich Type Theories

- More basic types (like in many-sorted logics)
 - More constructors (*e.g.* Pi-types, Sigma-types, ...)
-
- **Strong typing** prevents nonsense (just like in computer science) and helps with copredication (Chatzikyriakidis, Luo).
 - **Dependent function types** help account for donkey anaphoras (Ranta).
 - Intensionality helps distinguish between sense and reference.

Question : What should we take for basic types?

Common Nouns as Types

- There is a **basic type for each common noun**.
- A verb like *bark* is a function **Dog** \rightarrow **Prop**.



- “Milou is a dog” is represented as the **judgement** $m : \mathbf{Dog}$.
- For each type A , there is a predicate $p_A : A \rightarrow \mathbf{Prop}$ which says “I am of type A ”.

CN as Types and Negation

Problem: In Type Theory you **can't negate judgements!**

In particular, these are not well-formed sentences:

- “Milou is not a dog”.
- “The chair didn't bark” (not clear whether this should be an acceptable sentence).
- “If Milou is a dog, he likes bones”.

Chatzikyriakidis and Luo's Solution

They assume the existence of an operator:

$$\text{NOT} : \prod_{A:CN} \prod_{p:A \rightarrow Prop} \prod_{B:CN} \prod_{b:B} Prop$$

such that $\text{NOT}(A, p, B, b)$ means “ b does not p ” (possibly with B different from A).

They stated a few axioms for NOT and proved it to be consistent.

See, among others : S. Chatzikyriakidis, Z. Luo and T. Xue, *Propositional Forms of Judgmental Interpretations*, 2018.

A few criticisms against this view

- Unwanted sentences like “Milou is not even” or “The number 2 is not red” become acceptable;
- **Subtyping** problems;
- The case of **synonymy** (*e.g.* chien/clébard/cabot);
- **Syntactical** problems:
 - Modified nouns;
 - Determiners;
- **Complexity** problems:
 - Space complexity;
 - Type hierarchy.

Classifiers as Types

- Classifiers form a category of words in some languages (many Asian languages, all sign languages, *etc.*)
- *Example:* Japanese “Hon” is used to count long things, including rivers, roots, but also things that take long time such as movies, tennis matches.
- Typically a few hundreds of classifiers in a language.
- Classifiers can be used to group objects that have in common the possibility of being applied to the same predicate.

The “Comparable-Likely” Operator S

- For each basic type A , we assume the existence of a type $S(A)$ “containing” A .
- Intuitively, $S(A)$ contains the objects that are **likely to be mistaken** for inhabitants of A .
- There are coercions $A \rightarrow S(A)$ and equalities $S(S(A)) = S(A)$.
- Now common nouns are predicates **defined on the S -closure** of their classifiers.
Example: If there is a classifier **Canidae**, then *dog* and *canidae* are both predicates of type $S(\mathbf{Canidae}) \rightarrow \mathbf{Prop}$.

Perspectives

- Formalise and axiomatise the operator S .
- Find out whether this is **coherent** with the CN-as-Types or the Classifiers-as-Types approaches.
- The **genericity** puzzle:
 - “The chair didn’t bark”.
 - “Chairs don’t bark”.

Thank you
for your attention!

contact: leozaradzki@gmail.com

Some References:

R. Montague, *The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English*, 1973

A. Ranta, *Type-theoretical Grammar*, 1994

N. Asher, *Lexical meaning in context - a web of words*, 2011

C. Retoré, *The Montagovian Generative Lexicon $\Lambda T Y_n$: a type-theoretical framework for natural language semantics*, 2013

B. Mery and C. Retoré, *Classifiers, Sorts and Types in Lexical Compositional Semantics*, 2017

S. Chatzikyriakidis, Z. Luo and T. Xue, *Propositional Forms of Judgmental Interpretations*, 2018